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Abstract
This article examines the role of NGO resettlement workers 
in refugee camps in Southeast Asia during the late 1970s 
and 1980s. The workers offered psychological support to 
refugees whose lives were in turmoil, but they also helped 
them present themselves in ways that would be most 
attractive to Western host countries. This process involves 
both commission and omission. NGO resettlement workers 
sometimes actively guided refugees by giving them spe-
cific advice and training. At other times, they facilitated 
this endeavour by observing how refugees fit themselves 
into the selection categories of various states, but chose to 
remain silent in order to avoid jeopardizing the refugees’ 
chances for resettlement.
Résumé
Cet article examine le rôle des travailleurs du secteur de 
réinstallation oeuvrant pour les ONG dans les camps de 
réfugiés en Asie du Sud-Est pendant la fin des années 70 
et les années 80. Les travailleurs ont non seulement fourni 
des soutiens psychologiques aux réfugiés dont la vie avait 
été bouleversée, mais ils les ont également aidé à se pré-
senter aux pays d’accueil occidentaux sous des aspects qui 
seraient les plus favorables à attirer leur intérêt. C’était un 
processus qui impliquait des parts égales de commission 
et d’omission. Parfois les travailleurs du secteur de réins-
tallation oeuvrant pour les ONG ont activement guidé les 
réfugiés en leur fournissant des conseils et des formations 
spécifiques, tandis que d’autres fois ils ont choisi de les 
aider à atteindre leurs objectifs en observant passivement 
la façon dont les réfugiés tentaient de se faire conformer 
aux catégories de sélection de différents pays, afin d’éviter 
de mettre en péril leurs chances de réinstallation. 
The Vietnamese refugee crisis that began with the Fall of Saigon in 1975 and the harsh reality of com-munist rule,1 which culminated in the mass exodus 
of “boat people” beginning in 1978, was a defining moment 
for the international community and for countries of reset-
tlement. The UNHCR helped to negotiate a unique “orderly 
departure program”2 with the Vietnamese government and 
organized a number of international conferences in order 
to manage the crisis,3 and countries like the United States, 
Australia, and Canada developed new resettlement schemes 
in response to what was unfolding in the South China Sea. 
While some refugees returned to Vietnam in the 1990s as 
part of the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated with 
the Vietnamese government,4 before that many others 
were selected for resettlement by various governments after 
spending time in refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia. Over 
1.6 million refugees were resettled between 1975 and 1997, 
mainly in Western countries.5
The broad contours of the resettlement of Vietnamese 
refugees are now well known.6 Less well known, however, are 
the activities of “middle people” in the resettlement process—
namely, the many Western volunteers and members of NGOs 
who staffed the refugee camps that were created for the Viet-
namese and who provided comfort and aid to refugees and 
helped them to relocate to a safe third country. Occupying 
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positions at what Steven Castles and Mark Miller call the 
“meso level” of the migration process,7 these workers navi-
gated the space between receiving state selection and admis-
sion policies and the refugees who were seeking resettlement. 
This article focuses on the men and women who worked 
with Vietnamese refugees in transit camps in Southeast Asia 
beginning in the late 1970s and their perceptions of how 
refugees fit themselves into the selection categories of West-
ern states. Data were collected on the basis of oral history 
interviews with these workers. This article examines how 
NGO resettlement workers sometimes merely observed the 
complex ways in which Vietnamese refugees negotiated the 
process of being accepted for resettlement, and how at other 
times they acted as direct facilitators in this process. It must 
be emphasized, however, that even choosing to “observe” 
rather than act had repercussions. To observe, but to remain 
silent about some or all of what one sees, is itself a choice. NGO 
resettlement workers were forced to make these decisions 
daily, and they realized that action (or inaction) would have 
profound implications for the future of these refugees.
Theoretical and Conceptual Context
International migration is arguably best understood from a 
systems perspective.8 This perspective emphasizes the inter-
connections between the macro-level social, political, and 
economic forces that lead people to leave their countries of 
origin and state policies that define who should be admitted 
as an immigrant or refugee, and the micro-level individual 
and household-level calculus involved with decisions to 
leave and where to move. It also points to the importance of 
the “meso-level” third-party intermediaries who facilitate 
the migration. The latter, described by Castles and Miller 
as the “migration industry,” includes immigration lawyers 
and consultants, travel agents, labour recruiters, and people 
smugglers, as well as the representatives of voluntary agen-
cies and NGOs that help migrants and refugees.9
At the macro level, state immigration policies normally 
contain clear-cut categories defining those it deems admis-
sible and inadmissible. Most countries’ immigration laws 
also specify particular sets of policies governing the selec-
tion and admittance of visitors, students, workers (with or 
without the right of permanent residence), family members, 
refugees, and the like.10 These categories tend to be pre-
cisely defined and mutually exclusive. As Bakewell argues,11 
policy categories “are used to define those groups of people 
who are assumed to share particular qualities that make it 
reasonable to subject them to the same outcomes of policy. 
The policy will lay out how the organization concerned will 
interact with people who fall into a particular category; for 
example granting them legal rights or providing them with 
resources and services.”12
These policies are further codified and made progres-
sively more specific in immigration regulations and field 
processing manuals and guidelines issued to border control 
agents who are expected to implement policy. Visa issuance 
and other border control decisions essentially involve fitting 
individual cases into the boxes of the “admissible” catego-
ries within immigration policy.13 In this light, individuals 
are not, in some ontological sense, inherently “refugees,” 
“migrant workers,” or “permanent residents,” but rather 
become so because they are defined as such by states.14 
At the micro level, the real world of immigrants and refu-
gees is not as tidy as policy categories imply.15 As the litera-
ture on transnationalism and diasporas has demonstrated,16 
it is actually quite rare for individuals to completely cut their 
ties and relationships with their home countries, and they 
often move back and forth between their countries of ori-
gin and settlement. This calls into question the seemingly 
hard and fast distinction between “sending” and “receiv-
ing” countries. Moreover, individuals and households often 
have mixed motives for migration, and it can be difficult 
to ascertain whether individuals and households move for 
“economic” or “political” reasons. Though some countries 
like Canada now recognize “dual intent,” insofar as they 
recognize that an individual may seek temporary admission 
but also have the longer-term goal of settling permanently, 
individual visa applicants are assessed on the basis of the 
rules governing the application category under which they 
are applying. 
As Turton argues in his discussion of how “forced migra-
tion” is conceptualized, the distinction between “forced” 
and “unforced” migration is inherently problematic:17 “By 
trying to separate out the categories of migrants along a 
continuum of choice—free at one end and entirely closed 
at the other— . . . [various conceptualization] schemes are 
in danger of ignoring the most important quality of all 
migrants and indeed of all human beings: their agency.”18 
Turton is careful, however, to not completely dismiss 
the utility of the category of “forced migrant.” Instead, he 
pleads for a better understanding of the point of view of 
refugees, or “forced migrants,” their inherent humanity as 
“purposive actors,” and “their active decision making: how 
they reach the decision to leave, what information is avail-
able to them when they make the decision; the way in which 
their journey is financed, the degree to which it is planned 
with a specific destination in mind; the extent to which they 
had prior contact with that country, etc. etc.”19 
Thus, if state border-control decisions involve fitting 
individual cases into immigration categories, individual 
migrants and refugees, through their agency, also try to fit 
themselves into the categories they believe the state is look-
ing for by virtue of its immigration categories. As such, all 
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migrants—whether they apply as students, temporary work-
ers, family members, permanent residents, or refugees—are 
“purpose actors”20 who craft their biographies in ways that 
they believe will maximize their chances of being selected 
by the country in which they wish to settle. In so doing, 
they may selectively emphasize, de-emphasize, embellish, 
and modify aspects of their biographies, identities, and 
situations that they believe would favourably impress the 
country of their choice. Of course, the process of biography 
formation, or what Goffman called the “presentation of self 
in everyday life,”21 can cross into misrepresentation and 
fraud where claimed identities, experiences, relationships, 
and attributes have little or no basis in reality. 
In this context, third parties at the meso level also play a 
key role in this collaborative process of biography formation 
and categorization. Immigration lawyers and consultants 
sell advice to clients about how to best craft their biogra-
phies to meet their immigration-related objectives. People 
smugglers take advantage of individuals who are desperate 
to leave their countries of origin but who face difficulties in 
meeting a receiving country’s rules for legal entry. In both 
cases, the expectation of financial gain helps to explain 
the activities and interests of these third parties. However, 
while NGO resettlement workers and volunteers who work 
with migrants and refugees are not necessarily motivated 
by the prospect of financial gain, they are often part of the 
informal processes that contribute to the system of biogra-
phy categorization at both the state and individual level.
Individuals who work for the UNHCR are often called 
upon to initially screen refugee claimants and confirm 
aspects of their biography that make them eligible for their 
formal categorization as a refugee under the Convention 
definition of a refugee or protected person.22 Those who 
work for other NGOs may provide informal advice to indi-
viduals about what states are looking for, or what aspects of 
their biography they ought to emphasize. Some may simply 
observe how refugees craft their biographies, yet others may 
participate in subtle yet important ways such as by staying 
silent when they observe refugees crafting biographies to 
meet state-defined selection criteria. 
Data Collection
Our data were collected through one-on-one interviews 
and questionnaires administered to 14 individuals who 
worked in different refugee camps in Southeast Asia in 
the 1970s and 1980s. We located these former resettle-
ment workers through social media sites (e.g., “Galang 
Camp” and “Galang Refugee Camp” Facebook groups) and 
through chain referral. Our participants included ten male 
and four female workers in several international and non-
profit organizations, including the International Catholic 
Migration Commission (ICMC), Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS), Save the Children Fund (SCF), the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and World Relief 
(WR). Their work in refugee camps involved advising refu-
gees, administering health-care services, conducting basic 
screening, and providing educational training and cultural 
orientation to local volunteers. These local teachers in turn 
taught classes to refugees. Aside from these more obvious 
tasks, resettlement workers provided much-needed emo-
tional support and encouragement, which was especially 
important for those who suffered from the disappointment 
of being rejected for resettlement. 
Our interviewees now live in Indonesia, Uganda, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Many participants 
are now in their 60s, with a few in their 50s and 70s. A num-
ber of them continue to be involved in some capacity with 
refugees and underprivileged or marginalized populations 
in their own country or internationally.23 Our respond-
ents included both Westerners and non-Westerners. The 
interviewees are not of Vietnamese origin, but several of 
them speak the language fluently and thus were better able 
to understand the “lived experience” of the refugees they 
assisted.
Some of the interviews were conducted over the Internet 
and lasted between one and one-half to two hours. Several 
participants opted to give their answers in writing, and the 
completed responses were then sent back to us through 
email. We asked about the nature of their role as facilitators, 
their perception of the refugee situation, and the bureau-
cratic process of selection and resettlement of different 
Western countries. Their accounts of their experiences as 
resettlement workers were invaluable to us insofar as they 
gave us a window into how Vietnamese refugees negotiated 
the transition from camp life to resettlement abroad. It is 
important to note that our intention in this article is not to 
have resettlement workers “speak for” Vietnamese refugees. 
Rather, we are interested in understanding the experiences 
of resettlement workers and their interactions with Viet-
namese refugees. As has been indicated, these interactions 
ranged from more active roles in helping refugees craft their 
biographies and personae, to more subtle interventions, 
sometimes involved simply remaining silent.
These workers are uniquely qualified to offer insights into 
this period in history, because they can speak about it with 
relative freedom. However, even 40 years after their resettle-
ment, some refugees may be reluctant to talk about how they 
fit themselves into state-defined refugee selection categories 
lest they be accused of having deliberately misrepresented 
themselves and their situations to gain entry. In this way, 
the workers we have interviewed give their voices to those 
who cannot speak.
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These oral histories should, however, be treated with 
caution. As Abrams and Hamilton and Shopes argue,24 
there is a distinction within oral history research between 
the collection of “facts” about the past and the collection 
of “memories” about the past. Oral history tells us as much 
about what happened in the past as it does about how indi-
viduals remember the past, or as Abrams puts it, the ways 
in which “people articulate subjective experiences about the 
past through the prism of the present.”25 For many of our 
interviewees, the time spent in transit camps remains one 
of their most important and meaningful life experiences. 
As George noted when asked about how this work has 
affected him, “It’s a defining experience in my life and I’m 
very grateful for it. It’s made me a better person—giving me 
a greater appreciation for a life experience that I probably 
would never have had. It’s made my life much richer, much 
more interesting, so I’m very grateful for that experience.”
George’s remarks emphasize his evolution as a person, 
which he feels would not have been possible in any other 
context. Once again, it is important for researchers to be 
aware that personal narratives cannot always yield results 
that meet the highest standards of reliability and verifiabil-
ity, especially when such accounts are retrospective. This 
is even more likely to be the case when respondents’ self-
concepts are closely connected to their roles as resettlement 
workers. Therefore, they may be inclined to focus on situa-
tions that allow them to offer aid and comfort to refugees, 
and even help them to subvert the rules, rather than on 
situations in which they acted as informal gatekeepers for 
Western countries. This of course is a much less sympathetic 
role. All of these limitations must be taken into account, but 
nevertheless these narratives are immensely valuable in 
their own terms. 
Resettlement Workers and the Crafting of 
Biography
The academic literature on life in refugee transit camps often 
focuses on the psychological stresses and strains of living in 
camps and waiting for resettlement. One view tends to paint 
a picture of refugees in transit camps as lacking human 
agency,26 and as largely passive in the face of processes over 
which they have no control. Descriptions of camp life for 
Vietnamese refugees emphasize boredom, uncertainty, and 
feelings of helplessness among refugees in transit camps.27 
Referring specifically to the Vietnamese in refugee camps 
in the 1970s, Kelly argued, “The Vietnamese role was pas-
sive: things were done to them; they did very little. And, like 
much of camp life that followed, they stood in interminable 
lines waiting for something to happen.”28
In another study of camp life for Vietnamese refugees in 
the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Japan, Knudsen describes 
life as “meaningless, uncertain, waste of time, boring and 
passivizing.”29 This picture of camp life for Vietnamese 
refugees is further reinforced by Chan and Loveridge’s 
research on Kai Tak camp near Hong Kong in the late 
1970s.30 Though they point out that there are significant 
differences in various camps based on context, they argue 
that in Kai Tak camp, the Vietnamese experienced intense 
culture shock, because the camp was located so close to the 
developed, teeming metropolis of Hong Kong. In addition 
to culture shock, they assert that feelings of helplessness and 
passivity were the defining features that characterized camp 
life at that time. As they explain, the refugee is
thus reduced to impotence, either by having no control over what 
is done to him in the name of institutional efficiency, or for him 
under the banner of charity. In either case, the refugee is involved 
more as a spectator than an autonomous individual, a precise par-
allel in psychological terms of the powerlessness so many experi-
enced being washed around at sea on the journey from Vietnam. 
The only real difference is that being “at sea” is now metaphorical 
rather than literal. While there clearly exist many understandable 
reasons for the all-pervading depression, there would seem a case 
for Seligman’s (1975) notion of learned helplessness where there is 
no relationship between the efforts of the person to receive rein-
forcement and the outcomes of those efforts.31
This view of refugee camp life at the time, which may have 
been tainted by older colonial-inspired stereotypes of the 
Vietnamese as passive, stoic, and “incapable . . . of sustained 
thought or action,”32 stands in rather stark contrast to the 
view of camp life painted by those who analyze the experi-
ences of European displaced persons during and after the 
Second World War.33 It requires revision insofar as the NGO 
resettlement workers with whom we spoke emphasized the 
ways in which the refugees they observed, and with whom 
they interacted, consciously crafted their biographies to meet 
the selection criteria used by national immigration officials, 
made creative use of informal social networks and transna-
tional ties to develop migration strategies that reflected their 
own and their family members’ long-term resettlement goals.
Upon their arrival in the country of first asylum in the 
region, many refugees lacked proper documentation to help 
establish their background and personal identity. This was 
not uncommon as a result of the chaotic and dangerous 
circumstances involved in their exit from Vietnam. How-
ever, this presented a major challenge for both the authori-
ties and the refugees themselves when a complex system of 
paperwork was put in place to select refugees for resettle-
ment to one of the safe third countries. Refugees thus faced 
the daunting task of having to reconstruct their personal 
histories in ways that sounded credible and convincing to 
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authorities (i.e., immigration officials) who were, in effect, 
in charge of their fate. Conversely, immigration authorities 
had to sort through issues of credibility in order to assess 
whether the person admitted fit into their predefined selec-
tion criteria. Mike remembered the broad contours of the 
process as “like a lottery of arbitrary justice within a mas-
sive labyrinth of deception.”
Our interviews with resettlement workers revealed that 
refugees were adept at exercising at least some control over 
their destiny. Workers perceived that refugees used a num-
ber of strategies to make themselves appear more attrac-
tive to the country they hoped would accept them. This, of 
course, depended to a great extent on how a given country 
categorized different types of refugees. Generally, the most 
important criterion for acceptance by different countries, 
particularly the United States (which was also the first 
choice for many of the refugees),34 was immediate family 
reunification. This meant that in order for refugees to be 
accepted for resettlement quickly, they needed to show that 
they had other family members who were already living in 
the United States. Unaccompanied minors represented the 
second category. This included children under 18 who were 
in the camps alone. The third category included former 
South Vietnamese military personnel as well as those who 
worked for the US government during the war. Those with 
distant relatives in the United States were considered next. 
Lastly, refugees without any connection to the United States, 
but who had been rejected by at least two other countries, 
were also considered for resettlement.35
Canada’s policies were similar to those of the United 
States—that is, Canada also considered family reunification 
as a priority, although our respondents indicated that Cana-
dian authorities placed more emphasis on age, English lan-
guage acquisition, health, and the ability of the refugees to 
be integrated into the workplace.36 In other words, in order 
to be accepted by Canada, it was particularly important that 
refugees could demonstrate their employability. As Mike 
put it, “The Canadians took the best English speakers . . . it 
was generally perceived that Canada accepted the ‘cream of 
the crop’ of the refugees who did not have family connec-
tion abroad.”
Canada developed its own innovative private sponsorship 
program to help with the refugee crisis.37 The program was 
formally introduced in 1979 and involved the application 
of a “matching formula”—that is “the government would 
sponsor one refugee for each one sponsored privately.”38 
In other words, church groups or groups of five or more 
adult Canadians would be allowed to sponsor a refugee or 
a refugee family directly. This sponsorship involved provid-
ing resettlement assistance and support to refugees for their 
first year in Canada.39
Australia, while also focused on nuclear family relations, 
accepted young families as well as well as (often) unaccom-
panied women.40 Despite these clearly articulated selection 
criteria, one of our interviewees’ main memories of the Aus-
tralian selection system was that it was informally shaped 
by gendered understandings of resettlement. Some reported 
that being a single young female was considered an asset. 
“The Australians had a reputation for accepting young sin-
gle women,” recalled Doug. “I heard it expressed that the 
women would either find a mate or a job rather easily in 
Australia, so they would not put a strain on local resources.” 
Mike’s recollection was that “Australia accepted the most 
attractive women.” As previously noted, oral history data 
can be problematic because it is difficult to verify whether 
respondents are drawing conclusions based on fact or their 
perceptions and memories of the situation.
However, the work of James Coughlan and Adrian Car-
ton lends support to the assertions of the above-mentioned 
respondents.41 As Coughlan notes, “For a short period 
during 1978–1979 some Australian immigration officers 
working in Malaysia deliberately split families in order to 
select young single females for entry to Australia.”42 Carton 
observes that because females immigrants are considered to 
be non-threatening, they help to defuse the moral panic that 
is often associated with refugee crises.43
Other smaller, European countries, especially those that 
make up the Scandinavian Peninsula,44 and New Zealand45 
accepted smaller numbers of refugees. Some, like Denmark, 
did not have a clear system of selection criteria. Instead, 
their policies were more often based on the “need to fill 
quota” basis.46 Although these countries accepted very few 
refugees, they often took the more difficult cases, such as 
individuals with serious illnesses or disabilities, victims 
of sexual assaults, unaccompanied minors with no family 
connection, as well as the elderly with no family.47 
The brief discussion above of immigration policies in vari-
ous countries and the constraints that these policies impose 
on refugees highlights the need for refugees to craft their 
biography and identity in ways that help them meet these cri-
teria. The framing and reframing of one’s past life often might 
involve the creation of strategic family connections where no 
such connections actually exist. This of course requires great 
ingenuity and creativity, but as we will see, it can also lead to 
unintended and unanticipated consequences.
George, one of our respondents, was an American worker 
in a refugee camp in Thailand who later married a Cam-
bodian woman. He shared a story that spoke to the need 
for family connections to meet American selection criteria. 
He explained that his wife’s family had a male friend in 
California. This man had lost his wife in the genocide, and 
coincidentally, his wife’s mother had also lost her husband:
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What they tried to do was to show that this man was the husband 
of my wife’s mother. So they basically made up the story. They 
somehow convinced the officer that this was a true story, even 
though it wasn’t. My wife’s mother and sister were accepted by the 
US agency to reunify with the man who’d already been accepted 
for resettlement. So there were a lot of these stories, dealing with 
establishing family reunification—that someone they knew who 
had already been resettled was a family member. The interview-
ers gave priority to those families rather than somebody who had 
nobody in the US.
The attempt to construct family connections also 
involved changing names. As Daniel said, “Some [refugees] 
intentionally falsified names and documents in the hope 
of getting accepted by a certain country because ‘the new 
names’ had relatives in that country.” NGO resettlement 
workers also saw that changing one’s age was another com-
mon practice for the refugees, because, according to Emmy, 
“the older the refugees were, the more problems they faced 
in being accepted by different countries.” Another example 
of reframing biographies was offered by Michael, who spoke 
of what he remembered as the “strange” case of a “brother 
and sister.” 
There was a young man and woman. They had already been 
accepted to leave for the US. So I was interviewing them, not for 
their admission interview, but the resettlement interview. There 
were two interviews: one to see if they qualify, then after they 
were accepted, we do a second interview for resettlement place-
ment. So we know they were already going to go to the US, but we 
had to prepare their bio (language, education, etc.) to place them 
somewhere. And so there’s this brother and sister, and she was 
pregnant, and they appeared to be unusually close, like she was 
almost leaning on him.
It soon became evident that they were not brother and 
sister, but in fact, girlfriend and boyfriend. However, this 
couple was afraid to admit that they had misrepresented 
themselves, for fear of invalidating their application for 
resettlement. And as Michael was aware, there is a huge dif-
ference between what one knows (or suspects) and what can 
be proven:
We were trying to figure out where’s the father of the child—it 
always became a little fuzzy. At one point, they said she was raped 
by pirates—so tragic. It turned out they’re boyfriend and girl-
friend: they weren’t married, and he got her pregnant, and he lied 
to say that he’s her brother, because he was afraid they’d be sepa-
rated—she may go to one country and he may go to another. And 
we said, why didn’t you just tell the truth, and they said they were 
afraid. At that point it didn’t matter—they were already accepted 
and we just tried to place them, but they were so afraid that we 
would separate them.
Establishing family connections is especially important 
in successful relocation. However, this effort is complicated 
by important differences in Eastern and Western cultures,48 
which may have legal ramifications. Michael told of a 
situation of “a man and two women with ten children” he 
remembered dealing with where they steadfastly adhered to 
a story, in spite of its obvious inconsistencies, because they 
were aware of potential legal problems in the West:
The children all looked alike and were very similar in age. In fact, 
some of the kids looked like they were the same age as each other. 
They claimed that a man and one woman had all of these children, 
and the other woman was a sister of the wife with no husband, 
and living with them. And no matter what, they wouldn’t change 
their story. I had no way to prove it, but I believe that he had 
children by both women. It was a polygamous affair, which was 
not uncommon in Vietnam, especially for older people. But they 
knew that if they admitted to polygamy, they’d be rejected by the 
US, because that’s against the law. And so no matter what, they 
wouldn’t change their story. 
Thus, as we can see, part of the legacy of the war is the 
hiding of identity. One’s second wife is transformed into 
one’s sister-in-law, and one’s lover is reconfigured as a 
brother. The transformation of one’s biography and fam-
ily relationships is imperative if one is to meet the most 
important aspect of the selection criteria—family reunifica-
tion. Michael, the resettlement worker who described the 
situation outlined above, was aware that the account offered 
was probably untrue, but decided not to make an issue of 
it since to do so would jeopardize the family’s chances of 
being accepted. As has been noted, to choose to do noth-
ing or say nothing is also a form of facilitation. In this case, 
Michael chose not to act because of his knowledge of struc-
tural requirements in Western countries might place their 
resettlement in jeopardy.
Informal Social Networks 
Another strategy designed to enhance one’s chances of sur-
vival involves the exchange of information through informal 
networks—in particular with those who have already been 
screened by officials. Gaylord talked about the resourceful-
ness of the refugees: “There were daily rumours (in Galang) 
about the moods of the interviewers, which interviewer to 
avoid on a certain day, even which clothing colour seemed 
to be getting the most acceptances. They also knew ways of 
getting rejected by countries they did not wish to go to (like 
Canada, because it was considered too cold).”
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Gaylord’s story shows how refugees were not passive 
in the interview process. In fact, they would sometimes 
exercise agency by rejecting an offer to resettle in a par-
ticular country rather than the reverse. Through the shar-
ing of information, they knew that if they could not settle 
(for whatever reason) in two countries to which they had 
applied, they would then become eligible for admission to 
the US. For some refugees then, the question became “How 
can I make sure that I will not be able to resettle in country 
A or country B?” Sometimes a vehement “No!” would suf-
fice when, at the end of the interview, the refugee would be 
asked, “Would you like to go to Canada?”
Thus, being “aware” was very important, and one’s level 
of awareness increased the longer one stayed in refugee 
camps. Michael, whose job was to “pre-screen” refugees for 
their interviews with US immigration observed, “A lot of the 
strategies that people used to make themselves more accept-
able was awareness, which, over time, when you spent more 
time in the camp and you tried and you failed, you become 
more aware of which country had which criteria and you 
tried to meet them.”
As can be expected, information shared among refugees 
in the camps was primarily about the selection process of 
different Western delegations. Doug shared with us his rec-
ollection of refugees in both Malaysia and Indonesia—two 
of the refugee camps in the region in which he worked 
throughout the 1980s:
Rumours fuelled the camp. If someone was accepted or refused by 
a delegation, everyone wanted to know what questions were asked 
and how they were answered. I think all the refugees denied ever 
cooperating with or having anything to do with the communist 
government. There were lists of questions and answers that they 
passed among themselves, very often memorized in order. The 
delegations were aware of this and would occasionally ask ques-
tions out of order to trip up refugees. We really just focused on 
teaching them English and preparing them for when they would 
go on to whichever country accepted them.
As Doug’s account shows, the officials of various NGOs 
who helped to select refugees for resettlement were not una-
ware of the refugees’ efforts to make themselves appear to 
“fit” into the categories that made them eligible for resettle-
ment. Though they no doubt recognized that virtually all of 
those who were living in the camp were genuine refugees, 
they nonetheless had to balance their own emotions over 
the trauma individuals experienced with the need to main-
tain the integrity of their respective selection system. As a 
result, they had to continue to revise their selection strate-
gies in order to stay ahead of the refugees’ efforts to exercise 
agency. 
As previously mentioned, having military connections 
to the former South Vietnamese Army increased one’s 
chances of successful relocation in the US. But how could 
this be established when often people had no documents? 
We have seen, quite understandably, that refugees were per-
ceived by resettlement workers as having few qualms about 
the creation of a fictitious world. Michael describes how this 
was done:
Some had documents, but a lot didn’t. We had to interview them 
to build their profiles. The story was plausible that they might have 
been in the army. A lot could tell you where they were, what their unit 
was. You could tell they were military people by the way they talked, 
the way they held themselves—their stories were very authentic. But 
then there were the grey areas. Of course people began to tell each 
other. How did the interview go? What did they ask?
Michael further explains that the exchange of informa-
tion began to take on a structured and systematic form: 
“We found that at one point, they were having classes in the 
barracks, how to pass the test. They learned what kind of 
questions. So, how many bullets in an MC 16, or what’s the 
name of the basic training camps, or who is the commander 
of the 25th Division. And so we began to find out when you 
interviewed people, they were all giving the same story . . . 
people are going to do what they feel they have to do.”
Organization and control of information is by defini-
tion one of the strongest forms of exercising one’s agency. 
The dissemination of such information to those in one’s 
cohort, even in these difficult circumstances, demonstrates 
a refusal to be defeated by events. We have already seen that 
even rejection may involve a careful consideration of avail-
able knowledge. 
Transnational Exchanges
To achieve their resettlement objective, NGO resettlement 
workers also observed that refugees also relied on trans-
national exchanges. Transnational connections are often 
understood as part of a process in which individuals form 
multiple social, economic, and cultural relations between 
their country of origin and country of resettlement (as well 
as other countries).49 However, for the Vietnamese refugees, 
these connections began much earlier. As soon as the refu-
gees arrived in the camp, they would be sure to communi-
cate (by letter) with family members. They would ask their 
advice about the various government immigration policies 
and programs, the resettlement process in general, and 
family members’ prior experiences with camp life. These 
letters would also serve to demonstrate that the refugee had 
family connections in a safe third country, which would 
presumably aid in family reunification. Thus, the advice 
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that refugees received from overseas also played a role in 
their overall strategies of getting accepted by a country in 
which they were most interested in resettling.
Vera, who worked as an English teacher in Galang 
Refugee Camp in Indonesia from 1986 to 1996, noted that 
refugees put effort into “making a good record in the camp 
by working, volunteering, studying, not getting involved in 
vices, etc.” Daniel, a former English teacher, explained that 
keeping themselves active “was regarded by delegations as 
persons who wanted self-improvement in their lives,” which 
of course enhanced their chances of being accepted for 
resettlement.
Michael describes how the country-to-country exchange 
of information could even change the dynamics of reloca-
tion. As has been mentioned, many of the refugees chose 
the United States as their top country of resettlement. They 
were thus willing to spend the time waiting to be accepted. 
Refugee workers, on the other hand, found this frustrating 
because, in their view, the goal should be for refugees to get 
out of the camp as quickly as possible.
We tried to tell the refugees, “Look, you don’t meet the criteria—
go apply to Canada.” A Canadian just told me they’re frustrated 
because they can’t fill their quota. The Australians were frustrated 
because they were trying to be generous and the refugees go “I 
don’t want to go to your country. Please reject me, because I know 
that the Americans were willing to consider me if I were rejected 
twice.”
But then I would have this complication with the refugees and 
I’d say, “Look, don’t do that. You’re just going to delay your depar-
ture. Go! Your objective should be to get out of here. Everybody 
is going somewhere—just go! Canada is a nice country. Australia 
is a nice country.”
“Oh, no, no, no, Canada is too cold, and I don’t know anybody 
in Australia.” Or they would say, “I don’t want to go to Germany 
because they don’t speak English.”
“Oh, OK, well, you don’t speak English either.”
“Yes, but I want to go to America.”
However, once refugees began to hear stories from family 
abroad, they began to change their mind. Family connec-
tions began to emerge in countries other than the United 
States. Michael continues,
Another thing is once people began to hear stories from relatives 
and friends in Western countries (other than the US), the whole 
equation changed. People started to sign up for Canada. They had 
a friend there. They had a brother there. They heard it’s not so bad. 
They had socialized medicine, but in America, no. So once the 
word got back at least it’s not so bad in Canada, then people didn’t 
mind going there.
There were people in Norway who got picked up by the freight-
ers and the word got back that things were pretty good in Norway, 
because they’re a welfare state.
Following such advice, however, does not always result 
in the desired outcome. Michael recalled the situation of 
a young man he met in the United States many years after 
resettlement. This individual tried for many years to spon-
sor his parents, but he was unable to do so because he had 
created a new identity during his time in the refugee camp. 
He had given himself a new identity in order to appear to be 
a member of another family. As a result of this reconfigured 
identity, he and his biological family had to suffer the con-
sequences—they could never be reunited.
This course of action may have seemed rational at the 
time, but as Mike put it, it is not always a good idea to fol-
low the advice of others: “I would advise them to follow the 
guidelines set by UNHCR and the resettlement countries and 
ignore the bad advice some refugees received from their 
relatives overseas. Just answer some questions accurately 
and truthfully.”
This is not to say that all refugees embraced advice uncrit-
ically. For example, one young man who had received a copy 
of the US immigration guideline (now outdated) noticed 
that communists and homosexuals were barred from enter-
ing the United States. Of course the part about communists 
would be clear to him, but he did not understand the mean-
ing of the word homosexual. He asked a resettlement worker 
about it and was told it didn’t apply to him and not to worry.
The response from our interviewee above indicates how 
NGO resettlement workers choose to exercise their own 
judgment in certain cases. Our data demonstrate that this 
is true in a variety of situations, especially those that might 
jeopardize the refugees’ chances of resettlement. On several 
occasions, resettlement workers had to deal with the issue 
of “unaccompanied minors,” who may have been disguising 
their real ages in order to avoid conscription.50 One respond-
ent explained, “We had a lot of young men fleeing for that 
reason. So why wouldn’t they lie and say I’m 17 instead of 
I’m 20. I saw a lot of that—so do we blame them? At the 
same time, we had our own criteria. We don’t have criteria 
for young men fleeing conscription—that’s not in the book. 
We had criteria for unaccompanied minors to make sure 
that children get out of refugee camps.”
As this respondent has indicated, resettlement workers 
did not always go by the book, and “the book” does not 
necessarily include instructions on dealing with real-life 
situations. They must constantly deal with ambiguity, and 
this forces them to exercise their own judgment.
Cheryl, who had been a nurse in the Galang refugee 
camp in Indonesia, explained how she often had to balance 
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humanitarian concerns with the need to at least appear to 
be following prescribed rules:
For refugees with mental illnesses, I organized evaluations by a 
psychiatrist who was based in Bangkok and came periodically to 
Galang. He would bring medication that was not allowed by the 
camp authorities and leave it with me so I could administer it to 
the refugees. Once they were stabilized, I would organize a repeat 
evaluation by the psychiatrist so that the refugees could apply for 
migration to various countries. On a couple of occasions, we—the 
psychiatrist and I—asserted that refugees who had serious mental 
illness were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or post-
partum depression, both of which did not preclude migration to 
many countries—in order to allow them the chance to apply for 
migration.
Thus, these NGO resettlement workers became adept at 
navigating difficult situations, and facilitated refugee efforts 
to meet state-defined selection criteria. Their role as meso-
level facilitators, as the data indicate, involved much more 
than applying rules and offering specific information. It 
involved evaluation, interpretation, and decision-making 
on a subtle and nuanced level. 
Conclusion
From the state’s point of view, immigrant and refugee selec-
tion involves “marrying” general immigration rules and 
criteria to individual cases. Immigration officials, including 
those charged with initially screening and then selecting 
refugees for resettlement, must apply those rules and “fit” 
them to real-world cases. From the perspective of refugees, 
the policy categories and preferences of different coun-
tries become the targets they must hit in order to resettle. 
Refugees must in turn craft their biographies and present 
the situation of themselves and their family members in 
particular ways in order to meet the selection criteria of a 
particular state. 
NGO resettlement workers play intermediary roles 
between the macro and micro levels of the migration pro-
cess insofar as they variously observe, help, or hinder how 
refugees negotiate the bureaucratic selection process within 
refugee camps. In our case, some formally and informally 
helped refugees try to “fit” their biographies to the selection 
criteria of the country in which they were seeking resettle-
ment. Others observed what was going on and stayed silent, 
even when they thought or suspected that the refugees they 
were in contact with were deliberately presenting them-
selves in ways that did not reflect the reality of their fam-
ily or other circumstances. The fact that they stayed silent 
when they could have whispered their observations to local 
immigration authorities, or even write formal reports on 
what they were observing, arguably reflects their broader 
understanding of the challenges refugees faced in meeting 
policy criteria. Of course, it is also possible that some NGO 
resettlement workers did in fact inform immigration offi-
cials in specific countries of what they were observing in the 
camps and how refugees were crafting stories to make them 
acceptable. Some of our respondents may in fact have done 
this, but it is easy to see how, in retrospect, they might not 
want to emphasize their role in obstructing the resettlement 
of refugees decades earlier. 
Today, much of the public and political discussion focuses 
on “bogus” refugees: economic migrants who deliberately 
manipulate internationally recognized refugee protection 
norms to bypass immigrant selection systems.51 Though 
the NGO resettlement workers we interviewed recounted 
stories of embellishment, telling untruths, and the crafting 
of biographies or relationships, this does not alter the fact 
that the people with whom they were working were genuine 
refugees. Crafting biographies and using social networks 
and transnational ties to gather information about what 
different countries were “looking for” are normal parts of 
the migration process.52 They also reflect the agency that 
refugees possess, even in highly stressful and constrain-
ing circumstances, when meeting a bureaucratic category 
can mean the difference between a bright or bleak future. 
Data in this article should not, therefore, be interpreted as 
evidence that Vietnamese were not genuine refugees or in 
need of resettlement, or that there was something inher-
ently manipulative about their strategies to find a suitable 
country for resettlement. 
While the “rational” decision-making of refugees may 
seem irrational to others, we suggest that, when examining 
the situation of refugees, aspects of culture and personal 
history should be taken into consideration. The ordeal 
that Vietnamese refugees went through—from wartime 
experiences to planning their escape to making it in tran-
sit camps—illustrates that telling the truth may very well 
result in tragedy. Ultimately then, the aim is to survive and 
to prosper, for oneself and for one’s family.
Though refugee camps are sites of profound despair and 
suffering—and places where those who await resettlement 
are buffeted by processes beyond their control—this does 
not mean that refugees are completely powerless in these 
circumstances. The picture of Vietnamese refugee camp life 
that has been painted in some of the literature needs to be 
modified through better understanding of refugees’ limited 
forms of agency. Though they do not control the selection 
criteria of various counties, and are subject to policies and 
decisions within camps that are beyond their control, they 
do have some ability to try to achieve settlement outcomes 
that are most desirable from their point of view.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
38
 Notes
 1 The communist takeover of Vietnam meant that anyone 
with connections to the ancien régime or to the Amer-
icans faced oppression and persecution. This political 
backlash necessitated a mass exodus of the “boat people” 
who risked their lives at sea in search of freedom and a 
better life for themselves and their family in the West. 
 2 This program was created to allow for the immigration of 
Vietnamese to the United States and other countries. The 
aim was to help put an end to the human tragedy by pro-
viding a safe and legal alternative for the Vietnamese to 
leave their homeland.
 3 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, 2000: Fifty Years 
of Humanitarian Action (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).
 4 More information on this can be found in W. Courtland 
Robinson, “The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-
chinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and 





 5 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 2000.
 6 W. Courtland Robinson, Terms of Refugee: The Indo-
chinese Exodus and the International Response (London: 
Zed Books, 1998).
 7 Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, The Age of Migration: 
International Population Movements in the Western World, 
3rd ed. (London: Guilford, 2003).
 8 Alan Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and 
Transnational Perspectives (Toronto: Canadian Scholar’s, 
2010); Castles and Miller, Age of Migration.
 9 Castles and Miller, Age of Migration.
 10 Augie Fleras, Immigration Canada: Evolving Realities and 
Emerging Challenges in a Postnational World (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2015); Simmons, Immigration and Canada.
 11 Oliver Bakewell, “Research beyond the Categories: The 
Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into Forced Migra-
tion,” Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 4 (2008): 432–53.
 12 Ibid., 436.
 13 Vic Satzewich, Points of Entry: How Canada’s Immigration 
Officers Decide Who Get In (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).
 14 Nandita Sharma, “The ‘Difference’ That Borders Make: 
‘Temporary Foreign Workers’ and the Social Organization 
of Unfreedom in Canada,” in Legislated Inequality in Can-
ada: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada, ed. Patti 
Tamara Lenard and Christine Straehle, 26–47 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
 15 Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emer-
gency (New York: Routledge, 2006).
 16 Robin Cohen, Global Diaspora (London: Routledge, 
2008); William Safran, “Diaspora in Modern Societies: 
Myths of Homeland and Return,” Diaspora: A Journal of 
Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (1991): 83–99; Luin Goldring 
and Sailaja Krishnamurti, Organizing the Transnational: 
Labour, Politics, and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2007).
 17 David Turton, “Conceptualising Forced Migration” (pres-
entation, Refugee Studies Center’s International Summer 
School in Forced Migration, University of Oxford, July 
2003).
 18 Ibid., 9–10.
 19 Ibid., 12.
 20 Ibid.
 21 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).
 22 For more on this, please consult UNHCR, Convention and 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, http://www 
.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf.
 23 We were saddened to learn of the death of one of the 
respondents. This individual has been integral to the suc-
cess of our project, because without his help, we would 
not have been able to contact our other respondents. His 
eagerness to share his experiences with us has greatly 
enriched our research, and we will always be grateful.
 24 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (London: Routledge, 
2010); Paula Hamilton and Linda Shopes, “Introduction: 
Building Partnerships between Oral History and Memory 
Studies,” in Oral History and Public Memories, ed. Paula 
Hamilton and Linda Shopes, vii–xvii (Philadelphia: Tem-
ple University Press, 2008).
 25 Abrams, Oral History Theory, 7.
 26 Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, “What Is Agency,” 
American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 4 (1998): 962–1023.
 27 Kwok B. Chan and David Loveridge, “Refugees ‘in Tran-
sit’: Vietnamese in a Refugee Camp in Hong Kong,” Inter-
national Migration Review 21, no. 4 (1987): 745–59.
 28 Gail Paradise Kelly, From Vietnam to America: A Chron-
icle of the Vietnamese Immigration to the United States 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), 81. 
 29 John Christian Knudsen, “Boat People in Transit: Viet-
namese in Refugee Camps in the Philippines, Hong Kong, 
and Japan,” Bergen Occasional Papers in Social Anthropol-
ogy 31 (1983): 170.
 30 Chan and Loveridge, “Refugees ‘in Transit.’”
 31 Ibid., 754.
 32 Karl Ashoka Britto, Disorientation: France, Vietnam, and 
the Ambivalence of Interculturality (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2004), 94.
 33 Wsevolod Isajiw, Yuri Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, The 
Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after 
World War II (Edmonton, AB: Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies, 1992).
 34 The preference for going to America has its origin in the 
Vietnamese language. As a result of the outcome of the 
mass evacuation at the end of the war and the subsequent 
resettlement of those evacuees in America, the term ūi 
Mỹ (going to America) evolved to signify ūi vượt biên (to 
escape). Thus, escaping generally means going to America.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
39
 35 Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immi-
grants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 215.
 36 Ibid. 
 37 Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada 
and Australia Compared (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1989).
 38 Michael Enright, “The Vietnam War: Canada’s Role, Part 
Two: The Boat People,” CBC Radio, 30 April 2015, http://
www.cbc.ca/radio/rewind/the-vietnam-war-canada-s-
role-part-two-the-boat-people-1.3048026.
 39 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Summative Evalua-
tion of the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, April 
2007, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/evaluation/
psrp/psrp-summary.asp#s1.0.
 40 Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration; James E. Cough-
lan, “International Factors Influencing Australian Gov-
ernment’s Responses to the Indochinese Refugee Prob-
lem,” Vietnam Generation 3, no. 2 (1991): article 8; Adrian 
Carton, “Symbolic Crossing: Vietnamese Women Enter 
the Australian Consciousness, 1976–1986,” in Work-
ing Papers in Australian Studies, ed. Kate Darian-Smith, 
57–84 (London: Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian 
Studies, 1994). 
 41 Coughlan, “International Factors.”
 42 Ibid., 15. 
 43 Carton, “Symbolic Crossing,” 64–5.
 44 Howard Adelman, “The Indochinese Refugees in Sweden,” 
Refuge 2, no. 4 (1983): 10–11; Vad Jfnsson and Heidi Petersen, 
“Denmark: A National Welfare State Meets the World,” in 
Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State, 
1945–2010, ed. Grete Brochman and Anniken Hagelund, 
97–148 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012); Carol Dal-
gish, Refugees from Vietnam (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 1989).
 45 Trung Tran, “Vietnamese: Culture, Language and Work,” 
Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 13 
October 2014, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/vietnamese/
sources.
 46 See Jfnsson and Petersen, “Denmark,” 112.
 47 Adelman, “Indochinese Refugees in Sweden,” 10.
 48 James Freeman, Hearts of Sorrow: Vietnamese-American 
Lives (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
 49 Vic Satzewich and Nikos Liodakis, “Race” and Ethnicity in 
Canada: A Critical Introduction, 3rd ed. (Don Mills, ON: 
Oxford University Press, 2013).
 50 During the late 1970s, Vietnam and China were engaged 
in a border war, young men (18 years of age and older) 
faced the possibility of being drafted, and understandably, 
most were inclined to do anything that would allow them 
to avoid this.
 51 Frances Henry and Carol Tator, The Colour of Democracy: 
Racism in Canadian Society, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson 
Nelson, 2010).
 52 Turton, “Conceptualising Forced Migration.”
Anna N. Vu recently completed a PhD at McMaster Univer-
sity. The author may be contacted at vun3@mcmaster.ca. 
Vic Satzewich is professor of sociology at McMaster Univer-
sity. The author may be contacted at satzewic@mcmaster.ca.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
40
